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INTRODUCTION 
At 4:25 a.m., obscured in darkness, an Iranian drone breached 
Israeli airspace.  The Israeli reaction was immediate and twofold: an 
Apache helicopter was dispatched, which shot down the drone over 
the small northern town of Beit She’an,1 and eight F-16 fighter jets 
were dispatched that morning,2 charged with striking the Iranian 
installation in Syria known as T-4.  The installation, the purported 
base of the drone’s control vehicle3 and Iran’s Qods Force, was 
guarded by Iranian Revolutionary Corps operatives.4  One of the 
eight Israeli fighter jets was subsequently shot down—by Syrian fire 
this time—on its return flight over a field in Harduf, a village east of 
Haifa, Israel.5 
Since 1982, Israel and Iran have engaged in rhetorical battles,6 
intelligence battles,7 and proxy battles.8  They have accused each 
other of targeted assassinations and terror attacks.  However, prior 
to February 10, 2018, when this episode transpired, there had been 
 
 1 Seth J. Frantzman, From the Euphrates to Beit She’an: The Islamic Republic’s 
Dangerous Game, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Arab-
Israeli-Conflict/From-the-Euphrates-to-Beit-Shean-The-Islamic-Republics-
dangerous-game-542356 [https://perma.cc/L6JQ-YD7U]. 
 2 Jonathan Shepp, Israel’s Shadow War with Iran Comes Out of the Shadows, N.Y. 
MAG. (Feb. 12, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/02/israels-
war-with-iran-comes-out-of-the-shadows.html [https://perma.cc/YKN9-5DMT]. 
 3 Tony Badran & Jonathan Schanzer, The Iran-Israel War Flares Up, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-iran-israel-war-flares-
up-1518377530 [https://perma.cc/H255-6W45]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Josie Ensor, Israel Strikes Iranian Targets in Syria After F-16 Fighter Jet Shot 
Down, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 10, 2018), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/02/10/israeli-fighter-jet-shot-syrian-
anti-aircraft-fire-military/ [https://perma.cc/L85Y-MHCV]. 
 6 Ze’ev Maghen, Eradicating the ‘Little Satan’, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 5, 2009), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123093176783149767 [https://perma.cc/DF9R-
Z4XQ] (“The congregation of worshippers, some 7,000 in number, expressed their 
unanimous support for the Supreme Leader’s words by repeatedly chanting, marg 
bar Omrika, marg bar Esra’il ”Death to America! Death to Israel!”); see also Josh Levs, 
Iran Leader’s Call to ‘Annihilate’ Israel Sparks Fury as Nuclear Deadline Looms, CNN 
(Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/11/10/world/meast/iran-
annihilate-israel/index.html [https://perma.cc/ULJ4-RLQC] (“Khamenei posted a 
series of tweets slamming Israel.  Among them was a document called “9 key 
questions about elimination of Israel.”). 
 7 Bruce Riedel, Israel-Iran Covert Spy Games Become More Dangerous, BROOKINGS 
(Feb, 15, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/israel-iran-covert-spy-
games-become-more-dangerous/ [https://perma.cc/TM4X-TSRE]. 
 8 Shepp, supra note 2. 
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no public exchange of fire; in fact, their militaries had never engaged 
in any direct, open hostilities with one another. 
Because of this, the Iranian-Israeli conflict has escaped the 
governing regime known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).  
IHL is only applicable during an armed conflict, and it assumes that 
when a state is embroiled in an armed conflict, one state’s army is 
either combatting a second state’s army, or a state is defending itself 
against an armed resistance.9  These two types of clashes, identified 
as International Armed Conflict, or IAC, and Non-International 
Armed Conflict, or NIAC, are the only modes of armed conflict—
the only accepted classes of war—governed by IHL.10 
The Iran-Israel conflict, however, is neither an IAC nor a NIAC.  
Instead, it falls into a third regime known as gray-zone conflict, a 
mode of aggression that International Humanitarian Law, in its 
current form, is unprepared to handle.  Gray-zone conflicts are 
competitive, often aggressive interactions between states, or state 
and non-state actors, that fall between the traditional war-and-peace 
dichotomy. 11  They are shadow wars, intentionally fought outside 
the boundaries of law and traditional military operations, and 
employ a combination of tactics, including proxy wars, cyber-
attacks, and economic warfare.12 
It has been stated, in reference to IHL, that “[a]ll armed conflicts 
are therefore either international or non-international, and the two 
categories have to be distinguished according to the parties involved 
rather than by the territorial scope of the conflict.”13  This paper will 
prove the fallacious reasoning of this statement and reveal how 
limiting warfare to this duality discounts a third derivative of war 
known as gray-zone conflict which has achieved ubiquity in the 
twenty-first century.  Over the next few pages I will discuss Iranian-
Israeli relations before transitioning into a discussion of the forms of 
IHL, its pillars, and the conflicts to which it is applicable.  Following 
 
 9 INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED 
CONFLICT” DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? (2008), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-
article-170308.htm [https://perma.cc/5XR9-B4NK]. 
 10 Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2464 
(2008). 
 11 INT’L SEC. ADVISORY BD., REPORT ON GRAY ZONE CONFLICT (2017), 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/isab/266650.htm [https://perma.cc/6LB5-
JGCS]. 
 12 Id. 
 13 INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS [ICRC], FUNDAMENTALS OF IHL (2014), 
https://casebook.icrc.org/law/fundamentals-ihl [https://perma.cc/3E6S-AM49]. 
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this discussion, I will define gray-zone conflict—explain the 
distinctions between and similarities to the traditional modes of 
international war.  Finally, I will make the ambitious argument for 
both redefining armed conflict and for expanding the body of IHL 
to appropriately regulate gray-zone conflict. 
I. ISRAEL AND IRAN’S INEXORABLE MARCH INTO THE SHADOW 
CONFLICT 
Cloaked in conduct reminiscent of the Cold War, pundits and 
practitioners today are warning of a looming explosion in the 
Middle East, triggered by a further deterioration in Iranian-Israeli 
affairs.  Relations between Israel and Iran have not always been 
strained 14—it wasn’t until 1982 that Iranian-Israeli relations reached 
a formal point of tension.  Transitioning out of a revolution15 and 
entrenched in a stalled war with Iraq,16 in 1982 Iran was looking for 
an opportunity to expand their regional influence.  When the first 
 
 14 During Israel’s embryonic years, their relationships were dictated by the 
proverb “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”  In the 1950s, Iran served as a safe 
passage for Israel to help sneak persecuted Jews out of Iraq and into Israel.  In the 
1970s, Israel sold Iran $500 million worth of weapons and Iranian and Israeli 
engineers worked together in manufacturing a surface-to-surface missile.  This 
period was dictated by an Israeli foreign policy known as the policy of the 
periphery, where Israel courted relations with non-Arab nations in the Middle East, 
namely Morocco, Ethiopia, Turkey and Iran.  See Uri Bialer, The Iranian Connection 
in Israel’s Foreign Policy: 1948–1951, 39 MIDDLE EAST J. 292 (1985).  It wasn’t until the 
fall of the Shah in 1979 that relations fractured.  Interestingly, it was Israel who 
masterminded the Iran-Contra deal.  Still hoping that if Iran emerged victorious in 
the Iran-Iraq war, their government may be restored with a Western slant.  See 
SAMUEL SEGEV, THE IRANIAN TRIANGLE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF ISRAEL’S INVOLVEMENT 
IN THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (Haim Watzman trans., 1988). 
 15 Pushed out by religious Islamists under Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian 
Shah was overthrown on January 16, 1979.  The country became the Islamic 
Republic after an official referendum in April 1979, and Khomeini because the 
Supreme Leader that December.  Shah Flees Iran, HISTORY, 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/shah-flees-iran 
[https://perma.cc/9ZDR-ZMWT]. 
 16 Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980, capitalizing on the country’s post-
revolution turmoil in an effort to assert their dominance over the Persian Gulf.  Iran, 
however, moved the offensive in 1982, and for six years fought an offensive, though 
stalled campaign against Iraq, who had the support of most Western States.  Mike 
Gallagher, The “Beauty” and the Horror of the Iran-Iraq War, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 
2015), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-34353349 
[https://perma.cc/AQC8-Z2YG]. 
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Lebanon War broke out between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon,17 
Iran saw their opportunity—they deployed 1,500 members of the 
Revolutionary Guard to Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley in the east, laying 
the foundation for the organization that would ultimately become 
Hezbollah.18  Three years later, when Israel finally withdrew from 
Lebanon, the PLO was defeated but Hezbollah was only gaining 
momentum, evolving out of their nascent order into an Iranian 
proxy group.19 
Hezbollah’s existence is largely attributed to Iran’s steadfast 
support for their mission.  Committed to advancing the Iranian 
revolution and inculcating Shia Muslims across an arc of the Middle 
East that is largely Sunni, 20 by 1985 Iran had solidified their first base 
in what would become their “axis of resistance.”21  Over the years, 
Hezbollah became an Iranian proxy prototype, responsible for the 
bombings of Israel’s embassy in Argentina, a Jewish community 
center in Buenos Aires,22 and a bus of Israeli tourists in Bulgaria.23  
 
 17 Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to expel the Palestinian Liberation 
Operation from their border with Lebanon, an attack precipitated by an 
assassination attempt against the Israeli ambassador to the UK.  See Associated 
Press, Shlomo Argov, 73, Ex-Israeli Envoy; His Shooting Prompted an Invasion, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/25/world/shlomo-
argov-73-ex-israeli-envoy-his-shooting-prompted-an-invasion.html 
[https://perma.cc/KUV2-C58P]. 
 18 Trained, armed and funded by Iran, this organization was responsible for 
the bombing of two American embassies and the US and French peacekeeping 
troops in Lebanon.  They kidnapped some 90 hostages in retaliation for the 
disappearance of four Iranian diplomats in Lebanon.  Finally, they engaged in 
countless suicide attacks against Israeli posts and headquarters during the Lebanon 
War.  See Emile Hokayem, Iran and Lebanon, IRAN PRIMER (Aug. 2015), 
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-lebanon [https://perma.cc/UL33-
EPNX]. 
 19 Hezbollah, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hezbollah [https://perma.cc/3UTB-FDLA] 
(last visited May 28, 2018). 
 20 BENADETTA BERTI, ARMED POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS: FROM CONFLICT TO 
INTEGRATION (2013). 
 21 The Axis of Resistance is an Iranian led alliance between Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
Hezbollah and Hamas against Israel and what they consider to be US imperialism.  
See Payam Mohseni & Hussein Kalout, Iran’s Axis of Resistance Rises: How It’s Forging 
a New Middle East, FOREIGN AFF. MAG. (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2017-01-24/irans-axis-resistance-
rises [https://perma.cc/GL7A-ENVN]. 
 22 AUDREY KURTH CRONIN ET AL., RL32223, FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
(2004), https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL32223.pdf [https://perma.cc/EW2Y-Z2V7]. 
 23 Isabel Kershner, Iran Fires Rockets Into Golan Heights From Syria, Israelis Say, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/world/middleeast/israel-iran-attack.ht
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Iran and Hezbollah complement each other in a way states long for 
proxy groups to operate—since the revolution, Iran has been 
propelled by an expansionist foreign policy that Hezbollah is 
uniquely positioned to carry out,24 and in response, Hezbollah 
receives arms, training, and funds for their operations.25 
A. Second Lebanon War 
On June 12, 2006, Hezbollah solidified their identity as a 
movement that, first and foremost, is committed to resisting Israeli 
occupation in South Lebanon.  Operation True Promise, an air and 
ground invasion into Israel’s Northern Galilee, was accompanied by 
persistent rocket fire against Israeli civilians.26  Israel responded 
swiftly with Operation Change Direction, initiating strikes against 
Hezbollah that culminated in a ground invasion into Southern 
Lebanon.27  Though this 34 day war established Hezbollah as a 
resistance movement, it became evident that “ideologically, 
 
ml?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fisabel-kershner&action=click&contentCollection
=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlace
ment=1&pgtype=collection [https://perma.cc/AP5R-W4TC]. 
 24 Entrenched in Lebanon, Hezbollah can seamlessly move across state 
borders to carry out Iran’s religious and political agenda.  Their agility and unique 
political position in Lebanon allow them to also infiltrate states outside the Middle 
East. 
 25 Ben Hubbard, Iran Out to Remake Mideast With Arab Enforcer: Hezbollah, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/27/world/middleeast/hezbollah-iran-
syria-israel-lebanon.html [https://perma.cc/L9GU-QFXJ]. 
 26 On June 25th, 2008, Hamas, acting also as an Iranian proxy, launched a 
mortar, missile and rocket attack against Israel, kidnapping an Israeli soldier, Gilad 
Shalit, in the process.  Two weeks later, on July 12, 2006 Hezbollah commenced 
Operation True Promise: acting in the capacity of an Iranian legion, they launched 
a mortar and rocket assault in the Northern Galilee region of Israel, and using the 
fire and grime as cover, a Hezbollah unit crossed the border into Israel and 
ambushed an IDF convoy.  Three Israelis were killed, two more were captured, and 
four more perished in a tank explosion when the IDF launched a counterattack.  
Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israeli civilians persisted.  See Isabel Kershner, 
Rockets Hit Israel, Breaking Hamas Truce, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/world/middleeast/25mideast.html 
[https://perma.cc/D8C6-7UWZ]. 
 27 See Michael N. Schmitt, “Change Direction” 2006: Israeli Operations in Lebanon 
and the International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 127, 127 (2008). 
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economically, and politically, its fortunes remain intimately tied to 
those of Iran.”28 
In a letter to the United Nations Secretary-General and Security 
Council, Israel argued their operation in Lebanon is buttressed by 
Article 51 of the UN Charter.29  According to Israel, the 34-day 
military campaign was an expression of their inherent “right of self-
defence when an armed attack is launched against a Member of the 
United Nations.  The State of Israel will take the appropriate actions 
to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers and bring an end to 
the shelling that terrorizes our citizens.”30 
This letter, though it expressly justifies Israel’s actions as 
individual self-defense under Article 51, raises additional 
international legal questions: while jus ad bellum31 sets a normative 
standard for when the use of force is justified, one of which is an 
Article 51 basis, jus in bello (IHL) only applies when there is an IAC 
or an NIAC:32  When neither is applicable, International Human 
Rights Law (IHRL) is the exclusive governing regime.33  In this case, 
if Israel was indeed exercising her right to self-defense against 
 
 28 Hezbollah’s Global Reach: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Int’l 
Terrorism and Nonproliferation & the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Cent. Asia of 
the H. Committee on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 69–70 (2006) (statement of Ilan 
Berman, Vice President for Policy, American Foreign Policy Council). 
 29 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 30 Permanent Rep. of Israel to the U.N., Letter dated July 12, 2006, from the 
Permanent Rep. of Israel to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/60/937-S/2006/515 (July 12, 2006). 
 31 Jus ad bellum refers to the conditions under which a state may resort to 
armed conflict.  It encapsulates Article 51 of the UN Charter, which permits a state 
to retaliate against an aggressor when they are acting in self-defense, doctrines like 
Responsibility to Protect, or R2P, which authorizes states to join in collective action 
in defense of another state, and finally it permits enforcement action sanctioned by 
the Security Council, pursuant to Article VII of the Charter.  This doctrine is further 
discussed in the subsequent Section.  See William K. Lietzau, Old Laws, New Wars: 
Jus ad Bellum in an Age of Terrorism, 2004 MAX PLANCK U.N.Y.B. 383, 387–90. 
 32 Jus in bello regulates parties’ behavior during periods of conflict.  Also 
known as International Humanitarian Law, jus in bello seeks to minimize suffering 
during war by protecting the conflict’s victims.  While a party may have violated 
the conditions established in jus ad bellum when the conflict was initiated, IHL 
governs a conflict irrespective of the conflict’s raison d’etre.  This doctrine too is 
further discussed in the subsequent Section. 
 33 Human Rights Law is non-waivable.  It encapsulates the rights guaranteed 
to all citizens of the world, among them religious freedom, freedom of thought, and 
women’s rights, as well as the prohibition on slavery, torture, and inhumane 
punishment.  See IHL and human rights law, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 
2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/ihl-other-legal-regmies/ihl-
human-rights/overview-ihl-and-human-rights.htm [https://perma.cc/G34Z-
WB2P]. 
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Lebanon, that would be an acceptable just war,34 and would trigger 
the protective regulations of IHL—a legal regime that compromises 
between human rights and military necessity in their mission to 
protect civilians and non-combatants from war’s most capricious 
byproducts—while allowing states to achieve their military 
objectives.35  However, if Hezbollah was taking directions from Iran, 
it begs the question of whether IHL would be legally administrable 
in this conflict, or if IHRL would be the solitary regulatory regime, 
protecting civilians from torture and cruel and unusual 
punishment,36 but otherwise stripping victim nations of the 
protection IHL affords them in retaliating against aggressors.37  
Despite the overlap between these two regimes, both flexing their 
muscles to protect civilians from abuse, there are some areas where 
IHRL and IHL diverge: for example, the assumption IHL makes that 
killing, at points, is necessary to achieve a military objective.38  In 
these situations, because IHL and IHRL are both technically 
 
 34 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 74–85 (2006) (arguing that 
people and states can rightly defend themselves against threats of imminent 
violence). 
 35 Carl von Clausewitz referred to the “fog of war” as the inherent confusion 
and uncertainty that manifests from the gun fire and attacks exchanged in the 
battlefield and inherent insufficient intelligence.  The uncertainty regarding your 
military capability and your opponents during a campaign increases your 
vulnerability.  See CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 33 (Michael Howard & Peter 
Paret., trans., Princeton University Press 1976); see generally SUN ZU, THE ART OF WAR 
(Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford University Press 1963) (discussing generally the 
strategies a military can use to increase the likelihood of winning). 
 36 The preeminent doctrine in IHRL is the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, a doctrine littered in aspiration, but with minimal enforcement mechanisms.  
Otherwise, doctrines such as the CEDAW, CAT, ICCPR and ICESC, while they 
protect critical freedoms, do not protect citizens from the conflagration of foreign 
governments and non-state actors. 
 37 IHL weighs the nuances of military necessity and human dignity during 
times of war.  Their regulations provide states during war with the ability to 
respond against aggressors.  IHL is not intended to nullify wars, but rather to 
humanize them.  When that fails, it allows states to try violators for war crimes, 
further giving them protection against extreme violence and belligerence during 
war.  See Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, Untangling the Complicated Relationship between 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict, 6 PENN 
STATE J.L. & INT’L AFF. 203, 208–09 (2018). 
 38 Balendra, supra note 10, at 2464. 
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germane,39 the doctrine of lex specialis would define which law 
governs.40 
To evaluate whether lex specialis is applicable, it is essential to 
unpack whether there is an ongoing armed conflict between Israel 
and Iran.41  Discussing the ongoing conflict in South Lebanon in a 
Security Council meeting on July 14, 2006, the UN “called for the 
respect of international humanitarian law, and the protection of 
civilians and civilian infrastructures.”42  Though summarily 
declaring IHL’s application answers the question of whether Israel 
and Lebanon were in fact engaged in a war according to 
international legal standards, by choosing to view the Second 
Lebanon War through the purview of an armed conflict between 
Lebanon and Israel, the UN bestowed more fuel and authority into 
 
 39 The ICJ has held that it is possible to simultaneously violate both IHL and 
IHRL, elucidating that both legal frameworks can be concurrently applicable.  See 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 81, ¶ 221 (Dec. 19); see also United Kingdom, The Case of Serdar 
Mohammed (Court of Appeal and Supreme Court Judgments), INT’L COMMITTEE RED 
CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/united-kingdom-case-serdar-
mohammed-court-appeal-and-supreme-court-judgments 
[https://perma.cc/H7WX-RG8V] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (“[T]he protection 
offered by human rights conventions and that offered by international 
humanitarian law co-existed in situations of armed conflict”). 
 40 The doctrine of lex specialis, derived from the axiom “lex specialis derogate lex 
generali” which translates to “special laws override general laws” dictates that when 
two bodies of law are simultaneously applicable, but one contradicts the other, then 
the law specific law supersedes the more general law.  See Lex Specialis Law and Legal 
Definition, USLEGAL.COM, https://definitions.uslegal.com/l/lex-specialis/ 
[https://perma.cc/9KHW-GQRL] (last visited May 28, 2018).  The debate over the 
application of IHL and IHRL under lex specialis is vibrant, and some hold that IHL 
is specific law, whereas IHRL is both specific and general, depending on the legal 
issue, however the ICRC currently holds that “IHL constitutes the lex 
specialis governing the assessment of the lawfulness of the use of force against 
lawful targets” during international armed conflicts, but concedes that this holding 
is less more opaque during non-international armed conflicts.  See Lex specialis, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/lex-specialis 
[https://perma.cc/FSM5-NMFL] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). 
 41 Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, explains “the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them.”  Conversely, IHRL is generally 
reserved for, and was constructed to apply during, times of peace.  The exceptions 
to this rule are particular human rights concerns that have been labeled non-
derogable, which include enslavement.  See DANIEL MOECKLI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE “WAR ON TERROR” 92 (2008). 
 42 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Debates Escalating Crisis 
Between Israel, Lebanon; UN Officials Urge Restraint, Diplomacy, Protection of 
Civilians, U.N. Press Release SC/8776 (July 14, 2006). 
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Iran’s proxy arsenal, allowing Iran to evade the law’s reach and to 
nefariously expand their influence.  Furthermore, because Israel, 
according to the UN, was exclusively fighting Lebanon, Hezbollah’s 
relationship with Iran was able to escape public scrutiny, and 
instead Hezbollah grew as a part of the Lebanese political 
infrastructure;43 and Iran, therefore, excused from any involvement 
with Hezbollah, and through Hezbollah with Israel, bypassed legal 
accountability.  Israel, in their own effort to dismantle Hezbollah’s 
organization, assassinated several of their core leaders,44 however 
like the mythical Greek creature Hydra, as one leader falters, 
Hezbollah continues to grow, stronger, from these supposed 
setbacks.45 
B. Syria 
Both the First and Second Lebanon Wars prove that Iran is 
particularly adept at moving into the vacuum left behind by regime 
change and civil war, and Iran’s efforts in Syria further prove this 
skill.  Tehran deployed members of the Basij Militia, a voluntary 
mission, to Syria in 2012 as an advisory committee to Syrian 
President Bashar al Assad in his fight against the growing 
 
 43 See Jeffrey Feltman, Hezbollah,: Revolutionary Iran’s Most Successful Export, 
BROOKINGS (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/hezbollah-
revolutionary-irans-most-successful-export/ [https://perma.cc/KPF2-H8JS] 
(explaining Hezbollah began participating in Lebanese elections in 1992, with 
“[h]opeful speculation that Hezbollah’s growing role in politics and governing 
would diminish the importance of its arms and transform Hezbollah into a ‘normal’ 
party proved naive.”); see also Michael Slackman, Hezbollah Uses Influence to Jockey 
for Power in Beirut, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2006), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/06/world/middleeast/06lebanon.html?mtr
ref=www.google.com&assetType=REGIWALL [https://perma.cc/5D7B-EQ4L] 
(“Hezbollah is pressing its case for effective control of the government and a new 
election law, warning that otherwise it would move to bring down the government 
and force a new parliamentary election . . . so now, Hezbollah, an ally of Iran and 
Syria, has been emboldened.”). 
 44 Including Sheikh Ragheb Harb in 1984, Abbas Al-Musawi in 1992, and 
Imad Mughniyeh in 2008. Daniel Byman & Bilal Y. Saab, Hezbollah In a Time of 
Transition, CTR. FOR MIDDLE EAST POL’Y BROOKINGS & ATLANTIC COUNCIL BRENT 
SCOWCROFT CTR. INT’L SEC. (Nov. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Hezbollah-in-a-Time-of-Transition.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K2XY-AECD]. 
 45 See generally id.  (discussing the ways in which Hezbollah is in flux, and 
specifically its ability to adapt to changes in its environment). 
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insurgency in his country.46  But as the war progressed, the mission 
changed.  By 2015, as the Syrian civil war stretched into its fifth year, 
Quds Force Commander Major General Qassam Suleimi was forced 
to deploy volunteers from all six branches of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the capacity of “tactical 
advisors.”47 Their goal, like most states who employ gray-zone 
tactics, was to turn the Assad regime into a client state and to secure 
their “axis of resistance” 48 across the Middle East.49 
Although the threat against President Assad dissipated, the 
number of Iranian militants in Syria has not consequentially 
decreased.  Instead, they have been instrumental in executing Iran’s 
new plan: to establish a strong infrastructure in Syria to threaten 
Israel’s security.50  In a region where there is neither peace nor 
formal war against Israel, 51 Iran has been preparing for the day the 
status quo will cease to be gray.52 
 
 46 See Kristin Daily, Iran Has More Volunteers For the Syrian War Than It Knows 
What to Do With, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 12, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/12/iran-suleimani-basij-irgc-assad-syria/ 
[https://perma.cc/7P9P-9YZE]. 
 47 See id. 
 48 Iran has been centered on an “axis of resistance” but this term encompasses 
the goal of all states that employ gray-zone tactics.  Russia’s strategic aim is the 
eradication of what they perceive to be US dominion.  The axis of resistance is 
synonymous to this goal because it too is subsumed with establishing an arch of 
power that could strategically combat Western hegemony.  See Dan G. Cox & Bruce 
Stanley, US and Russia: The Gray Zone Spiral Toward Open War, E-INT’L REL. (Mar. 7, 
2018), https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/07/us-and-russia-the-gray-zone-spiral-
toward-open-war/ [https://perma.cc/I-WEHN]. 
 49 Iran is also using their iron grip in Syria as an additional funnel for arms 
transfers to Hezbollah, see Security Analyst: Hezbollah Continues Transferring Arms 
from Syria to Lebanon, JR. POST (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.jpost.com/Middle-
East/Despite-alleged-Israeli-strikes-Hezbollah-continues-moving-weapons-from-
Syria-to-Lebanon-336998 [https://perma.cc/K9VR-JKL2]. 
 50 Ben Hubbard, Isabel Kershner, & Anne Bernard, Iran, Deeply Embedded in 
Syria, Expands “Axis of Resistance,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/19/world/middleeast/iran-syria-
israel.html [https://perma.cc/2XEY-WJKG]). 
 51 Amid their growing conflict with Iran on their border with Syria, the Israeli 
Mossad was suspected in the death of an Iranian nuclear scientists on a bleak 
Wednesday in January 2012, the third Iranian nuclear scientist assassinated during 
the Syrian civil war.  See Dan Williams, Analysis—Israel uses risky “hits” in deadly 
shadow War, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-iran-
blast-israel-idUKTRE80A1KS20120111 [https://perma.cc/345S-T66U]. 
 52 Hubbard, Kershner, & Bernard, supra note 50.  See also Oren Lieberman, Iran 
Vows to Retaliate Against Israel for Syria Strike, CNN (April 11, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/04/11/middleeast/iran-israel-syria-strike-
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When an Iranian drone trespassed on Israel’s northern border 
with Syria on February 10, 2018, Israel responded by sending in 
eight F-16s to destroy the Iranian military command center.53  Since 
that cold winter day, Israel has violated Syrian sovereignty on 
several more occasions;54 in turn, Iran, not Syria, has exercised a use 
of force against Israeli sovereignty from Syrian territory.55  Iran and 
Israel have been embroiled in a shadow war since 1982, and Iran has 
consistently employed proxies in their fight with Israel—Hezbollah, 
Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.56  This shadow war is creeping 
into the territory of open warfare, and the symptoms of this 
emerging cataclysm have been conspicuous for years.  Had the 
international legal system been adept at constraining and regulating 
the shadow war, had it been able to hold actual players in this 
conflict accountable, and had they been able to apply the law of war 
in this theatre, Iranian ambitions could have been curtailed, and the 
inevitable, developing confrontation could have been avoided. 
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, DEFINED AND 
EXPLAINED 
International law has been adjudicating the Iranian-Israeli 
conflict not as an armed conflict between Israel and Iran, but—
distinctly—as armed conflicts between Israel and Lebanon,57 and 
 
intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/4W9E-G929] (explaining Iran’s intent to 
expand their operations in Syria to include military engagements with Israel). 
 53 Shepp, supra note 2. 
 54 On April 9th, missiles hit a compound at the Iranian T-4 airbase in Syria, 
targeting an advance Tor anti-aircraft system that had just arrived in Syria from 
Iran.  Syria and Russia blamed Israel for the attack.  Israel neither confirmed nor 
denied the accusation.  See Anshel Pfeffer, Israel Braced for Attack by Iran as Shadow 
War Hits Boiling Point, THE TIMES (April 22, 2018), 
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/israel-braced-for-attack-by-iran-as-shadow-
war-hits-boiling-point-w6rhvvpsr [https://perma.cc/RA8X-XHR5]. 
 55 Isabel Kershner, Iran Fires Rockets Into Golan Heights, Israelis Says, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/world/middleeast/israel-
iran-attack.html [https://perma.cc/2WZ8-ST22]. 
 56 Khaled Abu Toameh, The Iran-Hamas-Hezbollah Connection, GATESTONE 
INSTITUTE INT’L POL’Y COUNCIL, (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/11330/iran-hamas-hezbollah 
[https://perma.cc/PT5T-8JQW]. 
 57 See U.N. Press Release, supra note 42. 
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border skirmishes between Israel and Syria.58  These confrontations, 
moreover, for the most part have been adjudicated either as isolated 
insistences, or as fleeting, already resolved, conflicts.  Thus, the 
overarching confrontation which has been defining Iranian-Israeli 
affairs has been examined through the lens of jus ad bellum, the law 
of self-defense, which defines the conditions under which the use of 
force is legal, but which does not regulate or govern belligerents in 
the field of war.59 
This Section will (A) introduce jus in bello and jus ad bellum, and 
(B) define international humanitarian law and its relationship with 
International Human Rights Law, address the legal application of 
International Humanitarian Law to state actions, and demonstrate 
that the international legal community has been doing a disservice 
to world affairs in barring the classification of gray-zone conflicts as 
a mode of legal armed conflict.60 
A. Jus in bello, jus ad bellum 
Jus in bello, an alternative name for International Humanitarian 
Law or the law of war, regulates how a war is fought—how soldiers 
and aggressors must conduct themselves during an armed conflict.  
Preceding the jus in bello evaluation however is the necessary 
 
 58 See generally NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER, SYRIA-ISRAEL: THE 
GOLAN HEIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE (2009), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP83B00851R000400150002-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/S79Z-ST7L]. 
 59 See U.N. Charter Art. 51. (“the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations”); 
see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW  AND THE USE  OF FORCE (Oxford 
University Press, 4th ed. 2018) (explaining the application of jus ad bellum is limited 
to incidents where a party is the victim of an armed attacked therefore permitting 
the use force in order to ensure the safety and security of their nation.  Proving 
this point is the customary rules attributed to jus ad bellum, namely necessity, 
which explains that the use force can only be employed as a defensive technique 
to the extent that it can avert or end an attack, and no other non-forceful means 
are available to assuage the situation, and proportionality which limits the length 
and size of an attack to one commensurate to the threat posed by belligerents.). 
 60 Gray-zone conflicts abound in Russia and China as well.  With Russia, it is 
seen in how they have slowly been asserting their authority over neighboring states, 
with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.  With China, this tactic is seen in how they 
have been claiming the territory in the South China Sea.  See Sophia Pugsley & 
Fredrik Wasslau, Russia in the Grey Zone, EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 9, 
2016), https://www.ecfr.eu/wider/specials/russia_in_the_grey_zones 
[https://perma.cc/KW8L-GFP3]. 
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analysis of whether States had the right to deploy force in the first 
place.  Jus ad bellum is the framework that provides for situations in 
which there is a justifiable occasion for resorting to force. 
Historically, war was a legitimate political tool used by states to 
defend their sovereign interests.61  St. Augustine took this for 
granted when he imbued this basic idea with a hybrid of Christian 
tenets and political pacifism, generating today’s doctrine of just 
warfare.  In his framework, war can be just only when fought on 
God’s command: thus, constraints on the conditions for using force 
were merely morally compulsory before they evolved into the 
contemporary legal constriction of self-defense.62 
While St. Augustine ascertained the ethical elements of just war, 
Daniel Webster set out its legal structure in 1841 when, in a letter to 
British Minster Fox, he explained that a State asserting its right to 
anticipatory self-defense must demonstrate “a necessity of self-
defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice for means, and 
no moment for deliberation.”63 Based on the evolution of this single 
clause, the legal community derived four conditions permitting a 
State to act in self-defense which have become the bedrock of 
customary international law: “(1) the existence of a grave and 
pressing danger against the security of a State or its citizens 
necessitating such action; (2) the absence of means of protection 
other than the measures taken or to be taken; (3) the illegal nature of 
this danger; and (4) proportionality.”64 Today, Article 51 of the UN 
Charter permits a State to act in self-defense, but its conduct is still 
regulated by customary international law, informed by St. 
Augustine’s moral framework and regulated by the principles of 
 
 61 Robert Kolb, Origins of the Twin Terms Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, 320 INT’L R. 
RED CROSS, (Oct. 31, 1997), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnuu.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2ZVZ-3EDG]. 
 62 Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad 
Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 59 (2009). 
 63 Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to British Minister Fox, (Apr. 
24, 1841), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d.asp 
[https://perma.cc/M6M9-K46K]. 
 64 See Bin Cheng, Pre-emptive or Similar Type of Self-defense in the Territory of 
Foreign States, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1, 4–5 (2003). 
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necessity65 and proportionality66 from the Webster doctrine.  These 
principles in the aggregate comprise the jus ad bellum framework. 
International humanitarian law, alternatively known as jus in 
bello, is one of the oldest branches of international law and comprises 
today’s doctrine known as the law of war.  Elements of an 
understanding that certain actions are impermissible in warfare are 
seen in ancient civilizations, among them the Chinese, Indians, and 
early Middle Eastern societies.67  Hugo Grotius, jus in bello’s 
founding father, recognized that despite states’ historic restraint, 
state practice had also sanctioned inhumane activities during the 
course of war; thus, Grotius began to codify these historic moral 
guidelines and wrote the first treaty on the principles and 
regulations of legal conduct in war in 1625.  In his treatise, Grotius 
sought to “deprive those who wage war of nearly all the privileges” 
that current events had seemingly granted them, and evaluated 
critical assumptions about victims of war and humanitarian 
treatment.68  During this process, he “drew a distinction between 
what was legally permissible and what was ‘right,’” and compiled 
an extensive list of prohibitions, including the killing of women, 
children, prisoners of war, and noncombatants, as well as positive 
commandments for conduct in the battlefield, introducing what we 
know today as distinction and necessity in the use of force.69  
Aquinas similarly condemned states for what appeared to be a de 
facto license to slaughter civilians without repercussion, though his 
ethics did not amount to a formal jus in bello doctrine.70 
On this backdrop, the international community began to take 
affirmative steps towards protecting civilians and noncombatants in 
war: soldiers began wearing military uniforms so they could be 
 
 65 Necessity is a limit on self-defense.  Force can only be employed as a 
defensive technique to the extent that it can avert or end an attack, and no other 
non-forceful means are available to assuage the situation.  See ELIZABETH 
WILMHURST, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES IN 
SELF-DEFENCE, CHATHAM HOUSE 7 (Oct. 2005), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/108106 
[https://perma.cc/K62W-4ZU8]. 
 66 Proportionality relates to the size, length, and objective of the attack.  See 
GRAY, supra note 59, at 159. 
 67 EMILY CRAWFORD & ALISON PERT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
(Cambridge University Press 2015). 
 68 Steven Forde, Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 639, 645 
(2014). 
 69 CRAWFORD & PERT, supra 67, at 4. 
 70 Sloane, supra note 62, at 58. 
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distinguished from non-soldiers; soldiers adapted the code of 
chivalry; strides were made in battlefield medical care; the Red 
Cross was founded.71  All of these developments led to the signing 
of the first Geneva Convention in 1864 to protect the wounded and 
sick in armed conflicts, and subsequent developments led to treaties 
regulating weapons in combat.72  World War II produced the 
acclaimed 1949 Geneva Conventions, a series of four treaties 
protecting the wounded and sick on land and at sea, prisoners of 
war, and civilians.73 
In an effort “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war,”74 in 1945 the international community also adopted Article 
2(4) of the UN Charter, vowing to “refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”75  
Despite this prohibition, a state is still permitted to use force in two 
discreet incidents:76  UN Security Council authorization77 and 
individual or collective self-defense.78  Article 51 of the UN Charter 
recognizes “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,”79 
a recognition which has been interpreted to support “the lawfulness 
 
 71 See generally 2 Encyclopedia of Human Rights, History of Human Rights 
(David P. Forsythe ed., 2009). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Peter John Rowe, Law of War, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/law-of-
war#ref510811[https://perma.cc/9FAU-UZVU] (last updated Sept. 26, 2018). 
 74 U.N. Charter Preamble. 
 75 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4. 
 76 While R2P, or the responsibility to protect, is a doctrine utilized by 
international actors to warrant the use of force, this generally is for humanitarian 
purposes to prevent crimes against humanity, and is authorized by a General 
Council mandate and therefore distinct from UN Charter authorizations for the use 
of force.  See Use of Force and the Responsibility to Protect, INT’L COALITION FOR RESP. 
TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/
42-learn-about-the-responsibility-to-protect/242-use-of-force-and-the-
responsibility-to-protect [https://perma.cc/CDE7-37DU]. 
 77 UN Charter art. 42–43. 
 78 U.N. Charter art. 51. 
 79 Id. 
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of unilateral action in self-defense”80 so long as the limited 
engagements adhere to customary international law.81 
Thus, though the law of armed conflict encompasses only the 
legal framework of jus in bello, it necessitates the preliminary jus ad 
bellum legal analysis.  The distinctions between these two branches 
of law are critical.  Jus ad bellum delineates whether the cause of war 
is just; jus in bello is a constraint on war’s innate nature, regulating 
what military actions are permitted to transpire during an armed 
conflict.82  Jus ad bellum is preoccupied with the cassus belli of an 
armed conflict, a philosophy reflected in their principal of 
proportionality, which distinguishes whether the use of force is 
proportionate to the initial attack that permitted the responsive 
strike.83  Conversely, proportionality in jus in bello evaluates whether 
the weapons chosen for the strike are permitted with regard to 
expected casualties from the attack.84  Therefore, while jus in bello is 
exclusively concerned about human rights, jus ad bellum 
understands that when a state is attacked, they require the legal 
basis to act on its behalf.  Additionally, jus in bello’s determination 
that “in bello constraints apply equally to all parties to a conflict”85 
regardless of how just the war is, serves an added level of protection 
necessary for holding states and individuals accountable for their 
actions during war. 
 
 80 W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims to Revise the Law of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 82, 88 (2003). 
 81 The extent to which Article 51 sanctioned an “inherent right to self-defense” 
as protected by customary international law, as opposed to providing an exception 
to the Article 2(4) prohibition on the use of force is the subject of debate by different 
international players.  However, for the most part, it is unanimously accepted that 
a right to self-defense does indeed exist, and that the customary international law 
rules of necessity, proportionality, and imminence govern the scope of the 
engagement of force for the purpose of self-defense.  See GRAY, supra note 59, at 124. 
 82 Sloane, supra note 62, at 52. 
 83 WILMHURST, supra note 65, at 54–55 (discussing Jus as bellum 
Proportionality, and how it relates to the size, length, and objective of the attack). 
 84 Enzo Cannizzaro, Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In 
Bello in the Lebanese War, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 779, 785–91 (2006). 
 85 Sloane, supra note 62, at 52. 
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B. International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian 
Law 
International Human Rights Law, compared to International 
Humanitarian Law, is a perpetual regulation of state behavior.  
Recognizing that there are certain rights and freedoms that every 
state owes to their citizens, IHRL is a commitment codified through 
treaty, custom, and general principles of international law.  Unlike 
IHL, which has its roots in ancient history and crystalized over 
centuries of debate and progress, IHRL is a more modern 
phenomenon: this regulatory system matured on the coattails of the 
mass atrocities committed during World War II.  While IHL dictates 
the treatment of soldiers during a conflict and protects civilians from 
war’s savagery, IHRL does not distinguish between civilian and 
combatant, nor does it provide for “protected people.”  Further, 
because IHRL only governs either a state’s relationship with a 
person on their territory or a person subject to their jurisdiction, it 
does not create norms or obligations for a state’s relationship with a 
second state.  IHL, conversely, is binding on any state that is party 
to an armed conflict.  Where IHL therefore is inextricably linked to 
international relations, IHRL is an internal state affair.86 
Though there is clear overlap in human rights and humanitarian 
law, these overlays are not redundant.  For example, both bodies of 
law contain provisions providing for a prisoner’s humane detention, 
treatment in prison, and fair trial, but these similarities diverge in 
critical respects.  In IHL, captivity is not prohibited based on 
reasonable suspicion of a threat, and judicial review of internment 
is not required; however the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, a bedrock treaty of international human rights law, 
guarantees every person the right to their liberty, and holds 
“[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall 
be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court 
may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and 
order his release if the detention is not lawful.”87  IHRL therefore 
ensures that a state can only infringe on a person’s freedom when a 
crime has been committed, and avows to every person that even 
 
 86 Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and 
International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 313 
(2007). 
 87 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9.4, Mar. 23, 1976, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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during these transgressions they are still guaranteed access to a 
court of law.  On the contrary, IHL allows states to trade on liberty 
for the sake of security. 
Though the Security Council definitively held “essential and 
inalienable human rights should be respected even during the 
vicissitudes of war,”88 IHL not only governs interstate behaviors 
where IHRL is not applicable, it also legally gives states the 
necessary latitude to protect their state interests through 
distinguishing between civilians and combatants, and sanctioning 
proportionate attacks against military targets, among other 
necessary military actions.  Because an overlap in law is clarified 
under the principle of lex specialis,89 IHL reigns supreme during 
times of armed conflict—human rights law, after all, “was meant for 
peace, since peace was what the United Nations sought to 
achieve.”90  However, before we ascertain what qualifies as an 
armed conflict under international law, we must first distinguish the 
elements of IHL that make it such a critical component of 
international law. 
i. Rules of IHL 
International Humanitarian Law seeks to regulate state behavior 
during periods of armed conflict—international armed conflict and 
often in non-international armed conflict, which will be defined and 
analyzed in the subsequent Section—and to reduce armed conflict’s 
humanitarian effects.  Through the doctrines of military necessity, 
military distinction, and the principle of proportionality, IHL 
protects those individuals who are not formally involved in 
hostilities from violence and restricts violence to acts that are 
necessary to achieve the military objective. 
Since the 19th century, the international community has 
presumed the deployment of armed forces during war. 91  Though 
 
 88 G.A. Res. 237, preamble (June 14, 1967); see also G.A. Res. 2252 (ES-V) (July 
4, 1967), which refers to this resolution. 
 89 The more specific legal rule applies. 
 90 Berman, supra note 28, at 314. 
 91 The deployment of armed forces during war was enshrined in 1868 in the 
preamble to the St. Petersburg Declaration, which stated how the only legitimate 
target of war is to weaken the enemy’s military.  See Declaration Renouncing the Use, 
in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, INT’L COMMITTEE 
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this assumption has been tested with increasing regularity since 
1991,92 it is the basis for the doctrine of military necessity.  Article 
54(5) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions defines the 
modern construct of military necessity, explaining: 
In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the 
conflict in the defense of its national territory against 
invasion, derogation from the prohibitions contained in 
paragraph 2 [to attack, destroy, remove or render useless 
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian 
population] may be made by a Party to the conflict within 
such territory under its own control where required by 
imperative military necessity.93 
This pillar of IHL has since been codified by countless state 
military manuals, including Israel,94 and has thus been accepted as 
customary international law.95  It is therefore legally applicable 
during any armed conflict, even for states that are not signatories of 
Additional Protocol I. 
The principle of military distinction is recorded in Additional 
Protocol I, Article 48 of the Geneva Convention, and it requires 
states to differentiate between combatants and civilians when 
carrying out military operations during an armed conflict.  It 
protects civilians and non-military property from being the subject 
of a foreign military invasion by informing states that military 
personnel and property are the only legitimate targets during an 
 
RED CROSS (Nov. 29 – Dec. 12, 1868), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/declaration1868 [https://perma.cc/FZR7-QP8Q]. 
 92 The First Persian Gulf War in 1991 was the last traditional war.  Short and 
decisive, it was fought between the armies of different states, on battle grounds—
not by special operatives in cities.  See Richard N. Haass, Desert Storm, the Last Classic 
War, WALL STREET J. (updated July 31, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/desert-storm-the-last-classic-war-1438354990 
[https://perma.cc/VV3S-L3YB]. 
 93 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) art. 
54(5), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 94 IDF SCH. OF MILITARY LAW, ISR., RULES OF WARFARE ON THE BATTLEFIELD 25 
(2d. Ed. 2006). 
 95 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), Apr. 18, 1946 
(proving that customary international law is defined as “a general practice accepted 
as law”, and it is discerned out of widespread state practice as it evolves over time, 
and opinion juris, which demonstrates that state behavior is derived forma sense of 
obligation to act in that manner.). 
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armed conflict.96  Like necessity, distinction too has been accepted as 
customary international law.  And though Israel is not a signatory 
to Additional Protocol I and II, in the 1969 Kassem case Israel’s 
Military Court at Ramallah underscored how a civilian’s 
imperviousness from direct military attacks is one of IHL’s most 
fundamental rules.97 
Proportionality, like distinction, was codified to protect non-
combatants during military engagements.  It is recorded in multiple 
treaties,98 but it was Additional Protocol I, Article 51(5)(b) of the 1977 
Additional Protocols that set the standard for the legal basis of 
proportionality, holding that a state must abstain from an attack 
against a lawful military objective if the expected civilian harm is 
excessive in comparison to the anticipated military benefit of the 
operation.99 
When the ICRC appealed to the parties to the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War in the Middle East to respect the principle of proportionality in 
attack, the states involved in the hostilities (Egypt, Iraq, Israel and 
Syrian Arab Republic) acquiesced.100  Furthermore, as with necessity 
 
 96 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention I art. 48, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 97 See International Law Reports 470–83 (Lauterpacht, E. ed., Grotius 
Publications Limited, vol. 42, 1971); see also IDF Sch. Of Military Law, supra note 94, 
at 25. 
 98 See, e.g., Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention I, Jun. 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; see also Draft of Additional Protocol II; Protocol II to the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137; Amended Protocol 
II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, May 3, 1996, 2048 U.N.T.S. 
93; Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. No. 38544; 
General Orders No. 100 : The Lieber Code, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBR. 
(2008), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp 
[https://perma.cc/9MFT-7SFY]; see also Yugoslavia/Croatia, Memorandum of 
Understanding of November 27, 1991, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, 
https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/former-yugoslavia-special-agreements-
between-parties-conflicts [https://perma.cc/DW6J-J2P8]; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Agreement No. 1 of May 22, 1992, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, 
https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/former-yugoslavia-special-agreements-
between-parties-conflicts [https://perma.cc/DW6J-J2P8]; SAN REMO MANUAL ONE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise Doswald Beck 
ed.,1995); see also Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 2 Y.B. 
INT’L L. COMMISSION, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996); United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor Reg. 2000/15 (June 6, 2000), https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/c082f8/pdf/ [https://perma.cc/FN8R-G7P4]. 
 99 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention I art. 51(5)(b), Jun. 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 100 See Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter4_rule14 
[https://perma.cc/LAW7-MFMV] (“When the ICRC appealed to the parties to the 
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and distinction, Israel codified the principle of proportionality in 
their military manual, despite the fact that they are not party to 
Additional Protocol I or II.101 
The rules of necessity, distinction, and proportionality form the 
foundation for International Humanitarian Law.  IHL was 
constructed with the understanding that wars form exceptional 
circumstances that necessitate the existence of a body of laws to 
govern situations where morality has traditionally been suspended.  
By governing who and what can be targeted in a military operation, 
and what the justification for an operation can be, these laws give 
states the latitude to achieve their legitimate military objective and 
to respond to threats and attacks with the appropriate force, while 
simultaneously giving the international legal community the 
pretense to monitor a war, the grounds to interfere when the law is 
violated during a war, the responsibility and authority to bring 
justice to those who were wronged in a war, and to hold abusers 
accountable for their actions at the completion of a war.  For these 
reasons, international law must be permitted to govern armed 
conflicts that do not cross the threshold of the traditional definitions 
of either international or non-international armed conflict. 
ii. Defining International Armed Conflicts and Non-International 
Armed Conflicts 
Jus in bello is applicable to two specific modes of conflict: 
“international armed conflict” and “non-international armed 
conflict”.102  However, despite official legal recognition that these are 
the two types of conflicts qualifying as war, the documents that 
comprise IHL neglect to provide a formal definition for either IACs 
or NIACs. 
 
conflict in the Middle East in October 1973, i.e., before the adoption of Additional 
Protocol I, to respect the principle of proportionality in attack, the States concerned 
(Egypt, Iraq, Israel and Syrian Arab Republic) replied favourably.”). 
 101 See Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries: Israel, INT’L COMMITTEE RED 
CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_coun
trySelected=IL [https://perma.cc/4WRU-FRE6] (last visited May 28, 2018). 
 102 How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, 
INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Mar. 17, 2008), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/armed-conflict-
article-170308.htm [https://perma.cc/5XR9-B4NK]. 
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a. International armed conflict 
Seeking to limit war’s perverse effect, IHL, through the 
incorporation of the Geneva Conventions and its Additional 
Protocols, protects an expansive scope of people and objects.  Two 
Common Articles to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions make these 
principles legally relevant to armed conflicts.  Common Article 2 
(Art. 2), which will be discussed below, applies the Geneva 
Conventions to all armed conflicts between two or more contracting 
parties, whether the conflict is formally recognized as war or not.  
Common Article 3 (Art. 3), which will be discussed in greater detail 
later, applies some of these norms to non-international armed 
conflicts. 
The stories animating ancient and modern history prove how 
International Armed Conflicts, known colloquially as IACs, are the 
most traditional form of war in international affairs.  Defined by 
Geneva Convention (IV) Common Article 2, an IAC  is a “declared 
war or  any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them.”103  Commentary to the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 further affirms that: 
Any difference arising between two States and leading to the 
intervention of armed forces is an armed conflict within the 
meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the 
existence of a state of war.  It makes no difference how long 
the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.104 
Therefore, according to the most traditional framework, though 
duration, casualties, or state acceptance do not impact a conflict’s 
legal categorization, for hostility to meet the underlining 
qualifications of an international armed conflict it must minimally 
be between two states.  This definition is problematic for a multitude 
of reasons.  Chief among them is that today’s security problems do 
 
 103 Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries: Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 2, Aug. 12 1949, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c12
5641e004aa3c5 [https://perma.cc/57TR-3KJ3]. 
 104 Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries: Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Aug. 12,1949, Commentary 1952, Para. 1, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/COM/365-570005?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/YV45-CXH4]. 
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not necessarily transpire between two states—international events 
are plagued by the proliferation of gray-zone conflicts, which most 
frequently employ non-state actors as belligerents.  As discussed, 
Iran, for example, routinely uses Hezbollah as an agent against 
Israel. 
Commentary to the Geneva Convention also employs particular 
diction: it presupposes the “intervention of armed forces” in an 
armed conflict, distinctly using this term instead of ‘armies’ or ‘state 
militaries’.105  The 2016 ICRC Art. 2 commentary resolves this 
ambiguity, confirming that “armed conflict presumes the 
deployment of military means in order to overcome the enemy or 
force it into submission, to eradicate the threat it represents or to 
force it to change its course of action,” and further explains how 
deploying coast guards or security forces to a border region can 
constitute intervention by armed forces.106  Thus, armed forces are 
implicitly a state organ and, understood in conjunction with Art. 2, 
their deployment is limited to the enemy state or border regions on 
the conflict’s margins. 
Yet conflicts today often arise between two parties with battles 
transpiring in a third state, thus negating this definition’s utility.  
Consider our case study: though Israel may deploy security forces 
to the Golan Heights—the Israeli-Syrian border region—as a 
defense against Iran’s growing presence in Syria, this situation 
would evade Art. 2’s authority; because the rule qualifies an armed 
conflict as one state against a second with troop deployment to one 
of the borders of these two states, this definition contemplates these 
armed forces’ station in a framework where Syria, not Iran, would 
be Israel’s enemy state.  Furthermore, cyber-battles or economic 
warfare, where the enemy forces are deployed to labs and armed 
with computer code, circumvent this legal definition as well because 
they are not even classified as combatants.  Moreover, this 
commentary still bypasses the question of proxy wars: when Israel 
is fighting Hezbollah on behalf of Iran, who is Israel in an armed 
conflict against? 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries: Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, Art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, Commentary of 2016, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&doc
umentId=BE2D518CF5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518 [https://perma.cc/69L9-
N6RE]. 
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In The Prosecutor v. Tadic, a case arising out of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia and heard before the International Criminal 
Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia, the Court concluded that “an 
armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State”.107 
While an armed conflict involves two states engaged in military 
activity, Tadic also augments the definition by setting a precedent to 
include protracted armed conflict between a government and an 
organized group, or between two organized groups108.  Though this 
final piece of jurisprudence expands the definition of armed group, 
including groups that are not states, it still leaves enough ambiguity 
to question whether certain conflicts qualify as an armed conflict.  
Gray-zone conflicts encompass a multitude of strategies.  Though 
they include armed resistance, they also employ targeted killings, 
maneuvers that undermine foreign states’ governments such as 
misinformation campaigns, and economic extortion as military 
techniques109.  Though Tadic recognizes that an armed conflict can 
transpire between groups other than two states, under Tadic war is 
still legally defined exclusively in terms of kinetic warfare110 and 
therefore is not broad enough to qualify gray-zone conflict as an 
internationally recognized war. 
b. Non-international armed conflict 
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was adopted 
at the behest of the Red Cross.111  It applied the Conventions’ 
 
 107 Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Tr. for the Former 
Yugoslavia, (Oct. 2, 1995), 
https://www.mpil.de/files/pdf1/vrstraf0910_090911.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z3WE-WV9X]. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Competing in the Gray Zone: Countering Competition in the Space between War 
and Peace, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 
https://www.csis.org/features/competing-gray-zone [https://perma.cc/DVP2-
5VW2]. 
 110 See generally Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72. 
 111 Parties had a number of concerns about applying a convention of this 
nature to internal disputes, principally because of its implication on a state’s 
sovereignty.  See Crawford, supra at 67. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/5
2019] Gray-Zone Conflict Ubiquity 517 
underlining principles to internal armed conflicts, establishing a 
minimum threshold of care for wounded warriors and civilians, and 
protects noncombatants from the wrath of armed conflicts112 “in the 
case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in 
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”.113  Art. 3 set the 
precedent for applying IHL to conflicts where there are at least two 
parties to the conflict but where minimally one party is not a State.114  
Art. 3 does not formally define what constitutes an internal armed 
conflict, though the International Committee of the Red Cross 
explains that “traditional civil wars, internal armed conflicts that 
spill over into other States, or internal conflicts which third States or 
multinational force intervenes” are qualifying situations.115  Art. 3 
further establishes a belligerence threshold for internal unrest to 
qualify as a NIAC, which requires hostility to exceed “‘internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts 
of violence, and other acts of a similar nature.”116  From this, it has 
been determined that the threshold of hostility for the identification 
of armed conflict is a civil war.117  The regulation was motivated by 
the notion that a state’s domestic law would govern internal 
conflicts that don’t meet this margin.118 
The mid-twentieth century saw an exponential surge in the 
number of domestic armed conflicts.  Outraged at the development 
of the “new norm”, states, though with a level of trepidation, agreed 
to a new set of principles to govern internal armed conflicts.  Amid 
debate and a plethora of diverging opinions, state parties reached a 
 
 112 See Crawford, supra note 67. 
 113 Article 3, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(“Geneva III”), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/375-590006 [https://perma.cc/CU5E-YBNA]. 
 114 ICRC, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International 
Humanitarian Law?, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, Opinion Paper, 3 (Mar. 2008), 
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-
conflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/93QQ-7YPY]. 
 115 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols, INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-
law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-
conventions.htm [https://perma.cc/ZG4L-S7X6]. 
 116 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS (June 8, 1977). 
 117 ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 
IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 14 (2010). 
 118 Ian Whitelaw, Internationalization of Non-International Armed Conflict, 1 
PERTH INT’L L.J. 30, 32 (2016). 
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compromise and adopted Additional Protocol II with its twenty-
eight provisions in 1977,119 setting out new rules and regulations for 
the emerging legal vacuum of non-international armed conflicts.  
Additional Protocol II (APII) to the Geneva Convention, 
supplementing Common Article 3, was drafted to: 
Apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 
1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take 
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its 
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise 
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to 
carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to 
implement this Protocol.120 
APII imposes an even more restrictive definition for an NIAC 
than Art.3.  While Art. 3 applies to all situations of armed conflict, 
both when APII is applicable and when it is not, the inverse is not 
true: APII has a decidedly narrow margin of application.  It is only 
germane when there is a conflict between a government and internal 
belligerent forces,121 thus while a civil war between a government 
and a rogue actor qualifies, a domestic war between two rogue 
actors would be excluded from APII’s jurisdiction.  Furthermore, 
like Art.3, the conflict must reach a minimum threshold of intensity 
for the Protocol to apply,122 which precludes more isolated acts of 
 
 119 United States: Message From the President Transmitting Protocol II 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Relating to the Protection of Victims 
of Noninternational Armed Conflicts (1987), 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/protocol-II-100-2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UWU4-68RN]. 
 120 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), INT’L 
COMMITTEE RED CROSS (June 8, 1977), https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/475-760004?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/E5UQ-J3J7]. 
 121 See ICRC, supra note 115, at 3. 
 122 The issue of a threshold of intensity was also crystalized in the Nicaragua 
case.  Using the 1974 General Assembly Definition of Aggression, the ICJ explained 
that “the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another State” can 
only amount to an Article 51 armed attack if “such an operation, because of its scale 
and effects, would have been classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere 
frontier incident had it been carried out by regular armed forces.”  See Military and 
Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 
I.C.J. 14 ¶ 195 (June 27, 1986). 
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aggression from benefitting from these added safeguards.  
Moreover, the clause “exercise such control over a part of its 
territory” prevents the protocol’s application to contemporary 
armed conflicts between state and nonstate actors despite the fact 
that they may still meet the aforementioned standards.123 
Non-International Armed Conflicts, as a consequence of its more 
ambiguous legal regime and heavy restrictions, offers a lower level 
of protection to both the victims and participants of armed conflict.  
It dictates that “the application of the rules of humanity which are 
recognised as essential by civilized nations”124 must be upheld, but 
deprives combatants and prisoners of war of the protections 
afforded to military participants under International Humanitarian 
Law.125 
c. Armed conflicts, in general 
The Tadic case before the ICTY emphasized the two criteria 
necessary for a clash to qualify as an armed conflict, both for an 
NIAC and an IAC: 1) the conflict must be protracted, and 2) the 
armed group must be “organized and hierarchically structured”.126  
This is particularly important to NIACs, because, by design, an 
NIAC does not involve two militaries in combat with each other, 
both of which would  inherently be “organized and hierarchically 
structured.”  The court in Delalic, a second case emerging out of the 
ICTY, further elaborated that “in order to distinguish from cases of 
civil unrest or terrorist activities, the emphasis is on the protracted 
extent of the armed violence and the extent of organization of the 
parties involved.”127 
 
 123 Crawford, supra note 67. 
 124 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
Geneva, 12 August 1949, ICRC Commentary of 1958 to Article 3, Conflicts Not of an 
International Character, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDoc
ument&documentId=BE12C9954AC2AEC2C12563CD0042A25C 
[https://perma.cc/G9HN-SHJ7]. 
 125 See Ruth Lapidot, Yuval Shany, & Ido Rosenzweig, Israel and the Two 
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention, 92 ISR. DEM. INSTITUTE (2011). 
 126 Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72 at  ¶ 120.  
 127 Prosecutor v Delalic, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 184 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf 
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In discerning what meets the requisite organizational and 
hierarchical criteria, international jurisprudence generally evaluates 
whether an armed group has a command structure, operational 
capacity, the ability to procure and transfer arms, whether there is 
an internal disciplinary system, level of logistics, and the group’s 
ability to speak with a single voice.128  In this respect, IHL works to  
“assimilate non-state actors to states”,129 instead of recognizing 
that often non-state actors are proxy groups, acting as an agent at a 
state’s behest.130 
And yet, attributing a proxy group’s actions to a state in an effort 
to establish the existence of an armed conflict waged by a non-state 
actor is similarly problematic because of the high bar international 
law expects to prove attribution.  In Nicaragua v. US, while 
evaluating the question of what constitutes an illegal use of force, 131 
the ICJ established the threshold principle for attributing the actions 
of a nonstate organization to a state’s government.  In concluding 
“there is no clear evidence of the United States having actually 
exercised . . . control . . . as to justify treating the contras as acting on 
its behalf,”132 the ICJ established that a country providing monetary 
aid and arms to a nonstate actor is not enough assistance to attribute 
the non-state actor’s actions to the state.  Further the ICJ held that to 
qualify for attribution, the non-state actor’s attack must have 
transpired “because of the scale and effect”133 of the state’s 
assistance.  With these holdings the ICJ set a high bar for 
attribution, creating an acute challenge in the legal quest to 
 
 
 128 Prosecutor v Boskowski, IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 194–204 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/boskoski_tarculovski/tjug/en/080710.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4PS-TK3D]. 
 129 Nicolas Lamp, Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The ‘New 
War’ Challenge to International Humanitarian Law, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 225, 
231 (2011). 
 130 Id. 
 131 The Contras were a paramilitary group opposing the Sandinista 
government.  In 1981, based in a variety of neighboring states and funded by the 
US, they launched a guerrilla campaign against the government in Nicaragua.  In 
this case, Nicaragua argued that by aiding and abetting the Contras, the U.S. 
illegally used force against their government and illegally intervened in internal 
government affairs.  See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14. 
 132 Id. at ¶ 109. 
 133 Id. at ¶ 195. 
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attribute the actions of a non-state actor or proxy group to a state 
government.134 
The Tadic case similarly tackled the question of government 
control over a non-state actor.  To establish this relationship, the 
Court in Tadic embraced the definition of “overall control going 
beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces and 
involving also participation in the planning and supervision of 
military operations.”135  In this case, the Court was dissecting 
whether the actions of Tadic could be attributed to the state—if they 
were, this conflict would constitute an international armed conflict, 
thereby qualifying the application of IHL’s more expansive legal 
framework.  The principle enumerated in this case, however, is not 
applicable in the evaluation of state responsibility: the ICTY, as 
delineated in the ICTY case regarding the question of genocide and 
the Srebrenica, ruled that the Tadic “overall control” test is 
applicable in the determination of  whether there is an international 
armed conflict, not whether a government is responsible for the 
group’s behavior.136 
In an effort to amalgamate these tests and define the legal code 
for state responsibility and attribution, specifically with regards to 
when rogue and nonstate actors, or other states, act on a state’s 
territory, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted the Draft 
Articles for the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
in 2001.  The articles reflect a movement towards holding states 
responsible for ancillary actions that constitute legal transgressions, 
creating liability for states when non-state actors act under the 
direction or instruction of the state;137 when non-state actors 
 
 134 Jus ad bellum under this framework could only be violated by nonstate 
actors if the host state exercised effective control over the nonstate actor; the state 
exercising self-defense therefore must engage in fact-intensive investigation to 
prove substantial, tangible involvement of the host state in the attack launched by 
the terrorist organization.  This reading limits self-defense against a terrorist group 
to intra-state conflict, which encouraged the developing framework of classifying 
terror attacks as domestic criminal actions instead of international security 
concerns.  This skeleton, Tams argues, “made self-defence effectively unavailable 
as a justification for forcible anti-terrorist measures.” See Christian Tams, The Use of 
force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.  359, 368 (2009). 
 135 Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72 at ¶ 145. 
 136 Prosecutor v. Tadić, No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For 
the Former Yugoslavia Jul. 15, 1999), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3Z7H-2YL2]. 
 137 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries, [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMMISSION 31, art. 8. 
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demonstrate “elements of governmental authority” in their 
transgression;138 for actions by non-state actors when their “conduct 
[is] acknowledged and adopted by a state”;139 and for acts of 
omission.140 
While these new draft articles account for state responsibility on 
their territory, they did not develop language for expanding or 
clarifying armed conflicts.  As discussed, the treaties and protocols 
defining armed conflicts intentionally use vague terms, and in 
elaborating on what constitutes an IAC and NIAC, organizations 
and judges have relied heavily on former jurisprudence, travaux 
prepertoire,141 and customary international law.  What is discernable 
in this legal “no-mans-land” is that an IAC transpires between the 
governments of two or more states; an NIAC is fought between a 
government and a dissident group or two or more dissident groups 
within the borders of a single state; and more generally, for an 
armed-conflict to transpire, the armed groups must be organized 
with a hierarchical structure and the conflict must be protracted. 
The international community’s strict adherence to a legal 
construct informed by European military history has been 
handicapping the regime of peace, security, and justice.  The issue 
of the 2014 Gaza War has been lingering in the Office of the 
Prosecutor at the ICC as she weighs whether this war should be 
governed as an IAC or NIAC.142  This determination, though 
instrumental because certain humanitarian crimes are only illegal 
during IACs,143 is misconceived.  Iran has been providing Hamas’ 
with economic and military support for years, 144 and should thereby 
 
 138 Id. at art. 6. 
 139 Id. at art. 11. 
 140 Id. at art. 2. 
 141 ”The Travaux Préparatoires are official documents recording the 
negotiations, drafting, and discussions during the process of creating a treaty. These 
documents may be consulted and taken into consideration when interpreting 
treaties”, Collected Travaux Preparatoires, YALE L. SCH. LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBR., 
https://library.law.yale.edu/collected-travaux-preparatoire 
[https://perma.cc/27ZK-M94Y] (last visited May 02, 2019). 
 142 THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 
2017, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E99S-NXQK]. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Toi Staff, In Jerusalem, Trump Envoy on Iran Says US to Target Funding for 
Hezbollah, Hamas, TIMES ISRAEL (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/trump-envoy-for-iran-says-us-to-target-funding-
for-hezbollah-hamas/ [https://perma.cc/S5TJ-8UK]; Yonah Jeremy Bob, Hamas 
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legally qualify as the aggressor in conflict.  However, state actions 
that transpire in the gray-zone such as Iran’s relations with Hamas 
still elude this framework. 
IACs and NIACs do not abound today.  Rarely does one state’s 
army engage in formal hostilities with a second.  And outside the 
scope of civil wars and domestic unrest, today’s headlines do not 
broadcast stories of NIACs either.  For these reasons, the scope and 
reach of the definition of an armed conflict must be expanded, as 
must the accompanying pillars of IHL. 
III. TODAY’S WARS 
In 1928, brandishing a pen adorned with the inscription “If you 
want peace, prepare for peace”—a jeu de mots to the Roman adage “if 
you want peace, prepare for war”145—fifteen States signed the Kellogg-
Briand Pact146 and declared war illegal.147  It is ironic to outlaw 
something that inherently is a legal aberration, yet in1928 the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact was acclaimed as a monumental achievement 
in the realm of international peace keeping.  But then World War II 
broke out and the Kellogg-Briand Pact—only nine years after its 
conception—proved to be a hollow, historic relic of more sanguine 
times. 
In the wake of WWII’s atrocities, States, facilitated by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, or ICRC, modernized the 
law of war, imbuing jus in bello with the power of the 
aforementioned Geneva Conventions and their accompanying 
 
and Iran are Closest They’ve Been Since Syrian War, Senior Officials Say, JERUSALEM POST 
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Hamas-and-Iran-closest-
theyve-been-since-Syrian-war-senior-official-says-547353 
[https://perma.cc/J8GG-M32V]. 
 145 OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, The Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928, U.S. DEP’T ST., 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/kellogg 
[https://perma.cc/QMV6-T3QP] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018). 
 146 Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, July 24, 1929, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp#art1 
[https://perma.cc/L5X4-4PUS] (“The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare 
in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the 
solution of international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national 
policy in their relations with one another.”). 
 147 David A. Kaplow, A Nuclear Kellogg-Briand Pact: Proposing a Treaty for the 
Renunciation of Nuclear War as an Instrument of National Policy, 42 SYRACUSE J. INT’L 
L. & COM. 123, 131 (2014). 
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Additional Protocols.  That same year, the world’s nations attended 
the San Francisco Conference.  “Designed to end war and promote 
peace,” fifty-one original signatures adorned the United Nations 
Charter.  As the sun set on this final ceremony, President Truman 
made the celebrated proclamation: 
The Charter of the United Nations which you have just 
signed . . . is a solid structure upon which we can build a 
better world.  History will honor you for it.  Between the 
victory in Europe and the final victory, in this most 
destructive of all wars, you have won a victory against war 
itself . . . 148 
The UN Charter was designed with a clear political objective: to 
relegate war to the annals of history, and to guarantee the world a 
more peaceful future.  Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the use of force 
was sealed as the backbone of international order,149 and the jus ad 
bellum framework, which, as discussed, permits the use of force for 
individual or collective self-defense150 or with security-council 
authorization, 151 was generated.  Since 1945, the argument has even 
been made that the prohibition of the use of force has evolved into a 
jus cogens principle, a norm that no state can derogate from, with the 
exception of Art. 51 and Art. 42–43.152 
Law may have judged war morally reprehensible in 1928, but in 
the aftermath of World War II law has also normalized these acts of 
violence through the UN Charter, tentatively sanctioning armed 
conflicts with a regulatory system that hovers between protecting 
human rights and endorsing military engagements.  International 
armed conflicts were governed by this paradoxical system 
throughout the Cold War years and the End of History,153 and under 
 
 148 1945: The San Francisco Conference, U.N., 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/history-united-nations-charter/1945-san-
francisco-conference/ [https://perma.cc/RDZ3-98QZ]. 
 149 Kofi Anan is reported to have said in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror 
attacks, “No principle of the Charter is more important than the principle of the 
non-use of force as embodied in Article 2, paragraph 4.” Michael Wood, 
International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens in Practice? 53 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 
345, 345 (2013), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Wood_article.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9BZJ-PHZE]. 
 150 U.N. Charter, supra note 69, art. 51. 
 151 U.N. Charter, supra note 68, art. 42–43. 
 152 Sondre Torp Helmersen, The Prohibition of the Use of Force as Jus Cogens: 
Explaining Apparent Derogations, 61 NETHERLANDS INT’L L. REV. 167 (2014). 
 153 Francis Fukuyama gave a talk in Chicago in February 1989 that was 
published as a piece entitled “The End of History?”.  It was a reference to the end 
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its watchful eyes the Vietnam War broke out, Algeria battled France 
for independence, the Rwandan genocide transpired, and the 
Albanians in Kosovo struggled against the yoke of Serbian 
oppression.154 
As discussed, it was through Kosovo and its accompanying 
Baltic wars during the dissolution of Yugoslavia that international 
law recognized that international armed conflicts are no longer the 
norm.  The twenty-first century however has diverged even more 
from the former traditional framework that encouraged the UN to 
forbid one nation from invading a second.  Today’s headlines are 
dominated by events such as Russia annexing the Crimea, China 
slowly swallowing the South China Sea, or the will-they/won’t-they 
dance between Iran and Israel. 
What we’ve seen today is the supersession of gray-zone conflict 
as the conventional mode of war, with a world order governed by 
new regimes of combat where hostilities may transpire, but not 
between the armed forces of two enemy states.  Today’s wars use a 
fusion of military tactics, only one of which is conventional arms.  In 
the following pages, through a discussion of the available literature 
from scholars, military personnel, and US and European defense 
documents on this conflict, I present a definition of gray-zone 
conflict, explain how and why it has emerged as the new 
conventional form of war, and prove how the current definition of 
war has aided in gray-zone conflicts emerging ubiquity. 
 
of the Cold War, and an emergence of a period of time where foreign policy experts 
and international relations theorists believed liberal ideology triumphed over its 
antithetical alternatives.  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST, No. 16 (Summer 1989), at 3. 
 154 Some of these wars were International Armed Conflicts; others were Non-
International Armed Conflicts and included nonstate actors struggling against 
governments.  However, though these were all departures from more traditional 
wars, they still included typical, protracted battles with more conventional 
strategies.  These wars were a bridge in the evolution of warfare, proving that 
NIACs must be incorporated into the IHL framework, and also proving that the 
paradox—use of force is illegal, but once fire is exchanged there are new rules states 
must follow to continue to exchange fire legally—still has gaping holes. 
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A. What is a Gray Zone Conflict? 
Gray-zone conflict is an enigma.  “Alternately termed non-linear 
war, or . . . hybrid war,”155 gray-zone conflicts are conceptualized as 
multi-faceted clashes taking place “within the war and peace 
duality.”156  They are not yet at the level of a hot war, but they 
represent greater conflict than normal interstate competition. 
US Special Operations Command explains how “Gray Zone 
challenges . . .  are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of 
the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the 
relevant policy and legal frameworks.”157  It is a mode of conflict 
used by foreign powers because the activities are intentionally 
deniable as forms of aggression.158  If the scale of conflict is 
visualized as a map with diplomatic interstate competition on the 
far left and a fire-and-fury doomsday on the far right, gray-zone 
conflicts reside left of center.159 
Gray-zone conflict is able to remain below the threshold of 
traditional war because it is a patchwork of different tactics, 
consisting of cyber-attacks, terrorism and insurgency campaigns, 
disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, covert targeted 
killings, creeping military expansionism, and other military 
maneuvers performed in the shadows.  Utilizing these tactics as a 
vehicle to achieve a political end is not a new phenomenon.  
Economic warfare dates back to Antiquity.  Every spring, the 
 
 155 Douglass Cantwell, Hybrid Warfare: Aggression and Coercion in the Gray 
Zone, 21 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/14/hybrid-warfare-
aggression-and-coercion-gray-zone [https://perma.cc/2JJZ-WGN9]. 
 156 Gray Zone Challenges: Between the War and Peace Duality, MIL. LEGITIMACY 
REV. (Oct. 18, 2016), http://militarylegitimacyreview.com/?p=1715 
[https://perma.cc/EC4D-NBMN]. 
 157 U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, The Gray Zone 1 (Sept. 9, 2015), 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/USSOCOM-GrayZones.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B92C-553M]. 
 158 See, e.g., Amy Chang, Ben FitzGerald & Van Jackson, Shades of Gray: 
Technology, Strategic Competition, and Stability in Maritime Asia, CTR. FOR NEW AM. 
SEC. (Maritime Strategy Series), Mar. 2015, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Maritime-7-
Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UEF-7HE9] (discussing the geopolitical 
instability and risks associated with gray-zone conflicts and increasing appearance 
of such conflicts in maritime competition in Asia). 
 159 David Barno & Nora Bensahel, Fighting and Winning in the “Gray Zone”, 
WAR ON THE ROCKS (May 19, 2015), https://warontherocks.com/2015/05/fighting-
and-winning-in-the-gray-zone/ [https://perma.cc/Q5RD-5VF4]. 
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Spartans would march into Attica to burn the crops that fed 
Athens.160  Abimelech in Kings too sowed the city with salt, devoting 
it to bareness to ensure his enemies can never again benefit from the 
land.161 
Twenty-first century warfare however is even more devious 
than these ancient tactics, despite their obvious relation to one 
another.  First, today’s economic battles are not necessarily kinetic.  
As Michael Stecher explains, “[i]n Ukraine, for example, Russia does 
not need to destroy the economic infrastructure and logistics hubs 
present near the Ukrainian port of Mariupol; instead, by announcing 
that the Russian Coast Guard will search vessels as they pass 
through the Kerch Straits, Russia can ensure that no goods get in or 
out of the port.”162 
 Furthermore, states and militants are employing a hybrid of 
these different tactics, coupling economic warfare with proxy battles 
and propaganda campaigns.  In a world order defined by 
globalization, “the phenomenon by which national economies 
became entwined with and progressively subsumed within the 
international economy,”163 the weaknesses this construct generates, 
and the ramifications of these hybrid tactics, are devastating.  For 
example, an attack on the NY Stock Exchange would debilitate not 
only the US economy, and a suicide bomber in Piccadilly would 
handicap not only British civil infrastructure, but both instances 
would hijack global GDP.  Evidently, an attack on an economic 
complex can be carried out through more traditional weapons—a 
bomb or a machine gun for example—though these are not requisite 
tools: a computer virus would be an equally damaging attack on the 
global economy.  The complexity inherent to economic warfare 
includes the varied weapons at a group’s disposal, and the damage’s 
boundless ripple-effect.   
Propaganda and fake news have similarly been used as weapons 
for centuries.  Trading hyperbole and lies for political triumphs are 
old tactics: the Spanish-American War at the turn-of-the-century 
was dubbed “The Journal’s War” because of William Randolph 
 
 160 James A. Thorne, Warfare and Agriculture: The Economic Impact of Devastation 
in Classical Greece, 42 GREEK, ROMAN, & BYZANTINE STUDIES 225, 230–31 (2001). 
 161 Judges 9:45. 
 162 Interview with Michael Stecher, Senior Research Fellow, Center for the 
Study of the Presidency & Congress (Apr. 12, 2019). 
 163 Nicholas A. Lambert, Brits-Krieg: The Strategy of Economic Warfare, in 
UNDERSTANDING CYBER CONFLICT: FOURTEEN ANALOGIES 123, 123 (George Perkovich 
& Ariel E. Levite ed., 2017). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
528 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 41:2 
Hearst’s role in inciting anti-Spanish sentiment in the US.164  During 
World War I, new technology and developments in chemistry and 
engineering relegated soldiers to the trenches, scourging their lives.  
Dovetailing these scientific advancements however, verbal conflicts 
emerged as a powerful, infamous tool on the home front.  Flyers, 
banners, and radio commercials drew on people’s sense of 
patriotism and their morale, encouraging them to enlist and 
purchase war bonds.165  In the years leading up to World War II 
Hitler similarly wielded power over his citizens’ opinions with Nazi 
propaganda; during the war, Joseph Goebbels held the official 
government position Minister of Government Enlightenment and 
Propaganda.166 
Yet, despite this historic role, there are key differences between 
the propaganda and fake news of yesterday and the twenty-first 
century phenomenon.  First, while history’s pages are filled with 
these stories, the players were not transnational or international: 
governments peddled in lies and fabrications against their own 
public.  Today though, foreign states are trafficking in these words, 
steering them across borders, using them against foreign 
populations.  Second, the issue of fake news is compounded by 
technology and social media.  Hitler’s Mein Kompf sold millions of 
copies, and Americans in big cities were all consumers of yellow 
journalism, but today these myths and subterfuge spread across 
social media in nanoseconds, disseminating information that would 
undermine the entire democratic institution. 
Proxy wars have also been raging for centuries: a major power 
encouraging and steering a party into a conflict while only playing 
a minor role in the affair is commonplace.  Lenin used his own proxy 
group to “conduct political terror with plausible deniability” in 
neighboring states and no-mans-land during the period of the 
Russian Civil War.167  The US armed the Contras in Nicaragua after 
the Sandinistas led a violent campaign to overthrow the Somoza 
regime, hoping to quash communism but not interested enough to 
 
 164 Yellow Journalism: The “Fake News” of the 19th Century, PUB. DOMAIN REV., 
https://publicdomainreview.org/collections/yellow-journalism-the-fake-news-
of-the-19th-century/ [https://perma.cc/2HP7-X58L]. 
 165 See Alice Goldfarb Marquis, Words as Weapons: Propaganda in Britain and 
Germany During the First World War, 13 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 467 (1978). 
 166 Joseph Goebbels, HISTORY (updated Jun. 7, 2019), 
https://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/joseph-goebbels 
[https://perma.cc/X2VJ-Z6NH]. 
 167 Alex Marshall, From Civil War to Proxy War: Past History and Current 
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https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss2/5
2019] Gray-Zone Conflict Ubiquity 529 
put their own boots on the ground.168  Proxy wars are similarly 
pervasive in gray-zone conflicts, however, as is vogue, these too are 
complicated by technology.  Proxies have increasingly become 
nonstate actors, as seen with Iran utilizing not just Hezbollah, but 
Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad as well on their quest for 
regional hegemony.169  Military codes, drone surveillance, and 
weapon cyphers are digitized, creating further vulnerabilities in 
defense strategies.170  And because of the internet and globalization, 
nonstate actors have the potential to violate the security of other 
nations without resorting to conventional weapons, though 
globalization has also made it easier for nonstate actors to access 
conventional force.171  Proxy wars and domestic conflict engenders 
a distinctive criminal economy, exploiting humanitarian efforts and 
taxing immigration, cigarettes, and alcohol, providing funds for 
necessary arms.172 
Because gray-zone is a hodgepodge of military and non-military 
maneuvers, it would be difficult to apply IHL, whose pillars include 
military necessity, to gray-zone conflicts in its current form.173  This 
presupposition, that war is exclusively a military battle, keeps IHL 
ensconced in an era where war was fought in the trenches, and 
cyber-crimes, fake-news, and economic arm-twisting as joint tactics 
to achieve an end were beyond the realms of imagination. 
These schisms in both policy and law are exploited by nations 
particularly adept at navigating the gray-zone.  Chinese 
government-sponsored hackers deftly consume US military 
information.174  Chinese civilian fishing boats have caused near-
 
 168 See Iran-Contra Affair, PBS, 
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collisions with US military vessels in the South China Sea, off the 
coast of Chinese man-made islands.175  The nexus between these 
agents and the Chinese government is difficult to prove, eluding the 
traditional law of state responsibility.  International law cannot hold 
China accountable. 
Further, gray-zone operations allow a state to exercise 
aggression, engage in conflict, and leverage coercion without 
subjecting themselves to the risk of escalation and retribution that 
customarily accompany traditional wars.  “[O]ften conducted in 
ways that are meant to make proper attribution of the responsible 
party difficult to nail down,”176 reacting to a gray-zone attack runs 
the risk of flaunting international law with an outstretched military 
response, breaching internationally permitted countermeasures,177 
or thinking too small, thereby permitting the aggressor to succeed 
in their gambit and move one step closer to checkmate.  Russian 
recognition of South Ossetia and the Crimea are a case-in-point: the 
deployment of “little green men” into Ukraine, 178 the effective 
manipulation of videos and photographs179 to create enough 
ambiguity to avoid a direct, military reaction from NATO.  Russia 
was condemned for these actions, but the map of Europe has not 
been restored to the status-quo ante.180  The fact that Russia 
successfully instated a new status-quo bolsters gray-zone tactics as 
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a legitimate means for achieving new political ends and provoked 
NATO and the EU to launch a new center in Finland devoted to 
combatting gray-zone threats.181 
The most successful gray-zone maneuvers are ones performed 
incrementally.  Iran has slowly been planting their proxies across the 
Middle East: in addition to assigning the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard’s Corps (IRGC) and their expeditionary Quds Force across 
the Levant, Iran has been assembling a transnational network of Shia 
militias “including Salafi-Jihadi and Sunni extremist 
organizations (EOs) such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as well as Lebanese Hezbollah”182 to exploit 
the transitional, chaotic climate afflicting the Middle East and to 
establish a new social, cultural and security status-quo.  Their 
sophisticated achievements in electronic warfare are worrisome as 
well—the shocking report from Reuters on how an Iranian company 
had successfully fed fake news and propaganda across 70 websites 
in 15 countries with the aid of American web service stunned 
personnel across the US and its allied nations who believed Iranian 
cyber capabilities were third-tier.183  Among the damage caused by 
this campaign, “[a] news site called Another Western Dawn which 
says its focus is on ‘unspoken truth’ . . .  fooled the Pakistani defence 
minister into issuing a nuclear threat against Israel.”184 
Iran’s piecemeal construction of military bases in Syria is 
alarming, but the provocation is less shocking because of the slow-
and-steady pace used to build them.  The threat from ISIS in Syria is 
slowly weakening, and as it begins to falter even more, and by the 
time “world leaders can organize a peace deal for Syria,” Iran will 
have become the bedrock of Syrian security, with their proxies and 
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personnel embedded in the Syrian infrastructure.185  Yet, not only is 
their tactic geopolitically transformative, the accumulation doctrine, 
where States can hold others accountable for small acts of violence 
in accretion has been rejected by international law: 
[N]otably Israel took the view that ‘continuous pin-prick 
assaults’, if part of a general strategy, could be 
‘apprais[ed] . . . in their totality as an armed attack’.  But, by 
and large, the accumulation doctrine was received 
unfavourably and Israel’s reliance on it was not accepted in 
discussions in the Security Council.186 
This vacuity is a further example of how gray-zone tactics elude 
international law. 
Hostility, no matter its form, cannot remain unchecked by law.  
While gray-zone conflict is a hybrid—comprised of tactics and 
attacks in a wide array of fields—in its culmination, it surmounts to 
warfare.  It is a strategy, like any military strategy, with an end goal.  
Carl von Clausewitz said, “war is the continuation of policy by other 
means,”187 an apt, timeless summation.  Gray-zone conflict is a 
protracted conflict, categorized by a hodgepodge of tactics, fought 
between the war and peace duality, fought with the purpose of 
achieving an international political end. 
And in the case of Iran, looking at the combined threat of 
targeted killings, proxy wars, propaganda, and creeping military 
expansionism, as Iran infringes on the broader Middle East their 
political objective is an “axis of resistance” across the region and the 
ultimate destruction of the State of Israel.188  As is typical in gray-
zone conflicts, they’ve been strategizing this point since 1982 when 
they implanted Iranian proxies in Lebanon and established the 
group today known as Hezbollah.189 
Iran has not been held accountable for Hezbollah’s actions 
against Israel because basic international law does not have the 
teeth: as discussed, the principles of attribution do not apply to 
Iran’s relationship with Hezbollah, and the Nicaragua case requires 
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proof that Iran not only funds and trains Hezbollah, but effectively 
controls the organization too, a legal standard that is almost 
impossible to reach.190 
In some ways, we can try to hold actors accountable for their 
actions in the gray-zone through standard international law such as 
the UN Charter Article 2 ban on use of force,191 or the legal standard 
of appropriate counter-measures.192  But this is inefficient.193  Even 
making a case for preventive self-defense—for Iran to argue their 
drone infringement on Israeli borders was self-defense, for Russia to 
argue that their jets probed Finish and Swedish airspace in self-
defense194—is imprudent, and considers this altercation between 
Iran and Israel, or between Russia and the West, or between China 
and other regional players, as isolated incidents.  Like Russia’s 
actions in the Crimea, Iran’s drone is only one minor act in a larger 
sequence of actions, it is merely a battle in a loftier, four-decade war.  
Which is why gray-zone conflict must be regulated by IHL. 
IV. RE-DEFINING THE LAW OF WAR 
International law is a peculiar regulatory system.  Its skeleton is 
constructed by treaty law, but it is suffused and shaped by state 
behavior.195  Under international law, state behavior can create or 
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would be constant reprisal, countermeasures would become mainstream actions, 
not used as a tool to keep states bound by the law, as they were intended, (ILC art 
49.1) but instead used as a means of perpetual pay-back. 
 194 Thomas Forsell & Jussi Rosendahl, Estonia, Finland Say Russia Entered 
Airspace Before U.S. Defense Pact, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-russia/estonia-finland-say-russia-
entered-airspace-before-u-s-defense-pact-idUSKCN1270ID 
[https://perma.cc/7NE3-2C4W]. 
 195 The ICCPR was ratified by 167 nations and is a legally binding obligation 
for its signatories, however it likely binds the remaining 25 nations as customary 
international law as well: state behavior has thereby extended treaty application to 
states that refrained from adorning their signature to said document.  See Abdullahi 
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transfigure law, which generates a global order constantly in flux, 
metamorphizing as states adapt to changing landscapes.196  For 
these reasons, the global political system is a decisive public 
international legal tool. 
Just as globalization created new vacuums for states to exploit 
through gray-zone tactics, globalization too has modified the global 
stage, causing new forms of public actors to materialize.  This 
political milieu, where war and peace are both made, is an elliptical 
of different players and institutions, some with disproportionate 
authority but all with the capability to levy socio-political as well as 
legal impact.197 
This break down in the Westphalian system198 engendered a 
fragmented world order.  Today, “states have lost the monopoly on 
metaphoric, as well as actual, warfare.  War is now the continuation 
of a far more chaotic politics, in a far more chaotic political 
environment.”199  To fight it requires more than conventional 
military forces—it requires economic prowess, cultural 
manipulation, and a specific technological and cyber aptitude.200  
Yet, having the capacity to fight this war is irrelevant if you are 
legally unable to defend yourself to the extent necessary. 
The joint declaration signed by the EU and NATO on December 
6th, 2016 and their new center in Finland devoted to gray-zone 
conflict is proof that the international community recognizes that 
gray-zone conflict is no longer a creeping threat posed by obscure 
 
that are not self-executing in US domestic law are still recognized as evidence of 
customary international). 
 196 Balendra, supra note 10. 
 197 Globalization has given human rights NGOs unprecedented real-time 
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gathering resources, and ensuring human rights violations receive proper attention.  
See generally Cecilia Tortajada, Nongovernmental Organizations and Influence on Global 
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War, the Westphalian system refers to the “a system of states or international 
society comprising sovereign state entities possessing the monopoly of force within 
their mutually recognized territories.  Relations between states are conducted by 
means of formal diplomatic ties between heads of state and governments, and 
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powers, but rather a real danger.201  However, though regional 
organizations recognize the threat of gray-zone conflict, their 
declarations are not strategically effective: the EU-NATO 
cooperation framework “endorsed a common set of proposals 
focused on better coordination, situational awareness, strategic 
communication, crisis response, and bolstering resilience” 202 for 
gray-zone conflict—a declaration signed with an eye towards 
progress, though whose language is strictly aspirational.  This 
development is politically reassuring, but it does not amend the 
legal paradigm that gray-zone conflict currently eludes. 
A report on EU strategy similarly concluded “[i]n order to 
respond effectively, the EU not only has to develop a cyber-security 
strategy, a maritime strategy or a broader ‘global’ strategy; it must 
also learn how to synchronize all these aspects—and in a tailor-
made fashion.”203 NATO’s military strategy,204 the EU documents, 
and the briefings coming before the US Secretary of State205 and 
Department of Defense are declarations that the Western military 
and international policy communities are grappling in their 
responses to foreign gray-zone tactics, and underscore the necessity 
of implementing an additional legal regime to govern these 
conflicts. 
The Council of Europe adopted a draft resolution, recognizing 
that though gray-zone conflict has no universally agreed upon 
definition and no law it “does not operate in a legal vacuum”.206  The 
committee emphasized the pre-eminent threat gray-zone conflict 
poses: the legal asymmetry that allows users of gray-zone tactic to 
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avoid the legal repercussions of their actions, and to therefore 
brazenly defy international order.207  The assembly stressed that 
standard domestic and international human rights laws apply 
during gray-zone conflict, that the principle of self-defense allows 
victims to retaliate against a gray-zone adversary.  As discussed 
though, this declaration is only rhetoric.  Human rights law is 
invariably applicable—it applies in perpetuum.  What is lacking in 
the as it applies to these conflicts is the victim’s ability to respond as 
if war was waged against them, and as the assembly concluded “in 
practice, hybrid adversaries avoid manifest use of force that would 
reach the required threshold for triggering application of the above 
norm, therefore creating a legal grey area.”208 
Their answer to this question is to request that the signatory 
parties refrain from using gray-zone tactics themselves.209  One-step 
forward, two-steps back.  When adversaries are utilizing gray-zone 
techniques to combat another state, it is illogical and dangerous to 
ask a state to refrain from reacting in kind.  By requesting their states 
to desist from using gray-zone tactics, the Council of Europe is 
handicapping its members, forbidding them from defending their 
borders, sovereignty, and citizens. 
As mentioned in the previous Section, The European Center for 
Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats opened in October 2017.  
The think tank is comprised of eleven European countries and the 
United States.  All self-proclaimed victims of Russian gray-zone 
tactics, “the new center is dedicated to finding effective ways to 
push back.”210  Pushing back against the new normal is expected and 
necessary. 
Their first order of business should be agreeing to a unilateral, 
singular definition for this mode of war.  Without knowing what 
you are combatting, or what you are governing, it is impossible to 
emerge victorious from a fight.  In this regard, I recommend the 
council adopt the following definition of gray-zone conflict: 
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Gray Zone conflict is a mode of war that embraces tools 
including, but not limited to: cybercrime, cyber-espionage, 
the proliferation of fake news, disinformation campaigns, 
proxy wars, economic-extortion, targeted killings, 
establishing client states.  It does not necessarily employ 
military tactics, and is a hybrid of these, as well as other, 
tactics. 
Gray-zone conflict is malleable, and adapts to incorporate 
new combative techniques as they become available. 
Gray-zone tactics encompass long-term goals.  They can be 
employed by a single state over decades. 
Gray-zone tactics are not singular, isolated incidents: they 
are coordinated by a central command and may be used over 
decades to achieve a political end-goal. 
Gray-zone conflicts often are categorized by attacks that are 
most devasting by their cumulative effect on the victim.  
Gray-zone attacks, in accumulation, have the capacity to 
debilitate their victims in a comparative way to war. 
This definition should then be used in subsequent negotiations 
with additional European states and allies.  A formalized treaty on 
countering gray-zone conflict is unlikely to develop in the 
immediate future, but if this definition is accepted in domestic law, 
and capitalized on in diplomatic and military practice, it could 
emerge as customary law over time, just as cyber-espionage has 
become a norm and other new forms of information gathering and 
combat have become expected.211  This definition’s emergence as a 
custom would have a transformative impact on how states 
participate in gray-zone conflict.  A formal definition in the 
international law lexicon would normalize these conflicts, 
bankrupting their utility and depriving nations like Russia, China, 
and Iran of this gambit, whose strength lies in the tactic’s ability to 
 
 211 COLIN ANDERSON & KARIM SADJADPOUR, IRAN’S CYBER THREAT (2018) (noting 
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escape any characterization.  A common definition allows the 
community to know what they are tackling.  Furthermore, a 
common definition allows the international community to regulate 
these conflicts—rather than open the floodgates to a perpetual state 
of war, this will allow the victims to respond to attacks, the 
community to govern these conflicts, and the world-order to 
negotiate an end to these conflicts.  Ends do not emerge from 
undefined battles, but from battles that the international community 
to respond to. 
Second, in addition to the team of policy makers and military 
strategists, this committee should erect a legal team to work through 
the legal barriers barring gray-zone conflict’s entry to international 
humanitarian law.  For law to be effective, it must be dexterous and 
flexible enough to adapt to modern transgressions, but strong 
enough to regulate state behavior and hold violators accountable.  
This dual purpose is where IHL fails gray-zone conflict and is why 
IHL must be amended.  Despite rounds of debate over terminology, 
IHL still claims that two definitions of armed conflict account for all 
derivatives of the historic term ‘war’; that states will achieve their 
end-goals through military action; and that states, or the armed 
groups that essentially embody the organization and behavior of 
states, will adjust their actions to account for the sanctity of civilian 
lives.  In truth, IHL has failed to account for the fact that war is an 
agile term, waxing and waning over time to adapt to the modern, 
international playground.  IHL, in its effort to create a utopian 
society, has lent itself to the construction of a dystopian reality. 
This team must redraft the content of international humanitarian 
law.  First, the committee must redefine aggression212 to include the 
accumulation doctrine.  The threshold of force cannot be measured 
by a triggering event: it must consider individual incidents that, in 
the aggregate, surmount to a level of force equal to an armed 
conflict.  War should be defined by its caliber, the amount of force—
both kinetic and non-kinetic—applied, even if it is over time, and by 
the degree of intensity employed to achieve their targeted end. 
Second, IHL must account for the fact that military ends can be 
achieved without one state’s army ever firing a shot at an enemy.  
The law of attribution must be changed to create new legal norms 
that will hold states responsible for proxy activity.  The doctrine of 
 
 212 The General Assembly, in Resolution 3314, defined certain international 
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military necessity too is only useful when armed forces are engaged 
in battle—when the end-goal is not weakening the enemy forces, but 
expanding influence across a region, or wiping a country off the 
map, military necessity, as a regulating force, becomes obsolete.  
Necessity, after all, does not play a role in law when the enemy’s 
ultimate goal is unquestionably illegal. 
Further, IHL, through proportionality and distinction, was 
drafted to prevent civilian casualties from the scourge of kinetic 
warfare.  Gray-zone conflict, through circumventing kinetic 
warfare, infused civilian casualty with a new meaning.  First, proxy 
wars capitalize on civilians sympathetic to their cause, or susceptible 
to coercive tactics making them mules in transferring arms or 
funds.213  These innocents become victims of psychological torture, 
emerging from these battles in many ways more broken than those 
exposed to explosives and shrapnel.  Additionally, cyber-attacks 
target the private and public sector in equal proportions, exposing 
civilians to vulnerabilities unimagined when the Geneva 
Conventions were drafted.214  How do you define a victim when the 
attack is happening thousands of miles away, yet hundreds of 
thousands are affected by the proliferation of fake news?  What is 
proportionality when the objective is unrelated to armed forces?  
The new definition of war, to remain relevant in the twenty-first 
century, will have to confront the looming issue of civilian casualties 
in a new framework that accounts for the changing game. 
All of this must be accomplished with an eye towards the long-
term goal of adopting an accompanying treaty to the Geneva 
Conventions or an additional set of Additional Protocols re-defining 
war.  If the definition of gray-zone conflict does get implemented 
into domestic policy and emerges as custom, then future treaty 
negotiations would be more likely to take place. 
When an Iranian drone intercepted Israeli airspace on February 
10, 2018, Israel’s response was swift.  This midnight duel stoked the 
fears of military personal across the globe, but it was not anomalous.  
Since Ayatollah Khomeini’s ascent, Iran and Israel have been locked 
in battle against one another, but under the umbrage of the midnight 
sun, away from public view.  These assaults have transpired in 
Lebanon and Syria, Latin America, and Europe.  The tools: 
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espionage, political warfare, propaganda, electronic and cyber-
attacks, proxy battles.  Everything short of kinetic action, until 2018.  
This cyclical hostility is made possible by a number of converging 
factors.  Globalization has relegated borders to a mere façade; 
technology has allowed foreign actors to permeate all corners of the 
earth, making code and locks a farce; these mediums have made 
proxies easier to control.  And law, the system intended to regulate 
the changing world and to ensure peace and security is maintained, 
has fallen behind, entrenched in an era where kinetic, as opposed to 
hybrid, tactics are the norm. 
Had IHL adapted to new forms of state responsibility, Iran 
would have been held accountable for using proxy groups in 
Lebanon, for manipulating the battles in Syria, for funding and 
coordinating Hamas’ agenda, and for steering Pakistan into issuing 
a nuclear threat alert against Israel.  Had IHL adapted the 
accumulation doctrine, Iran’s actions would have amounted to a 
declaration of war decades ago. 
Gray-zone conflict, through cloak-and-dagger operations, has 
shattered the status quo, reminding the international legal 
community that current events can indeed render law ineffective 
and obsolete.  However, international law is endowed with the 
ability to change—through treaties, through state behavior, through 
having enough leaders decide that it should.  War is no longer 
equated to one belligerent bombing, or invading, a second.  Today, 
there is a new world order, and the world needs a new law of armed 
conflict to govern it. 
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